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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

CLARK EQUIPMENT CREDIT
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent_,
vs.
T RAN S P 0 R T EQUIPMENT
CENTER, I N C., a corporation,
JOHN N. GALANIS and DENA
GALANIS,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
9637

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
Although originally joined with a different action
by a different plaintiff, the actions were separately considered. The appeal before the court in this case No.
9637 arises out of an action by Clark Equipment Credit
Corporation against Transport Equipment Center, Inc.,
on a promissory note, and against John N. Galanis,
1
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Dena Galanis, Nick Galani~, Nora Galanis, 1 Ponald
H. Moyes, and Betty Moyes, on their guaranties of
that note.
Only Clark Equipment Credit Corporation is a
respondent in this appeal. Clark Equipment Company
is a respondent in another pending appeal arising out
of the same case below.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent agrees with appellants' statement.
The $110,927.36 for which the judgment was entered,
however, was in accordance with a supple1nental complaint file~ by the plaintiff on September ·It>, 1961
( R. 77-79) , and is based upon an agreed figure as. to the
amount of interest paid (Stipulation dated June 26,
1962, forwarded as a supplement to the record and filed
in this court on July 19, 1962).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
From appellants' statement it is not clear who seeks
what. On February 28, 1962, Nick Galanis and Nora
Galanis filed a notice of appeal (R. 17 4) which was subsequently dismissed by this court on those appellants'
motion. On March 19, 1962, the remaining defendants
filed a· notice· of appeal (R. 177), but ·only Transport
Equip1nent Center, Inc., John N. Galanis, and Dena
Galanis are now' shown in the appellants' brief as appellants. The position of' Donald H. and Betty Moyes is
left unclear.
2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts is too abbreviated
to show the issues as prescribed to the trial court, or the
basis for the trial court's judgment; and some statements purporting to be statements of fact are statements
of the pleadings- proved by subsequent discovery to
be unfounded.

The Pleadings
A review of the pleadings will contribute to an
understanding of occurrences in the court below. ( Inasmuch as Nick Galanis and Nora Galanis, two of the
guarantors on the revolving credit note, have heretofore dismissed their own appeal, we will refer only to
the issues as made between the plaintiff corporations
and the defendants pursuing the appeal.)
The complaint (R. 1-3) contained two separate
and distinct claims. The first was by Clark Equipment
Credit Corporation ("Credit") against all of the defendants on a "revolving credit note" (R. 104) which incorporated a "revolving credit agreement" (R. 94-101).
The claims against the individual defendants were based
upon an unconditional guaranty of payment (R. 105).
The second claim was by Clark Equipment Company ("Clark") against Transport Equipment Center,
Inc. ("T.E.C."), on an open account. Clark Equipment
Credit Corporation and the individual defendants were
not involved in this claim.
3
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One answer was filed by Nick Galanis and Nora
Galanis (R. 12-15) another (with counterclaim_) by the
remaining defendants (R. 16-21). The latter, answer
raised the following defenses: failure to state a claim;
denial of maturity; waiver; and estoppel.
The counterclaim had two "causes of action.'' The
first, asserted only against Clark, alleged breaches of the·
T.E.C. dealer agreement (R. 117-124) with respect to
warranties, delivery dates, and specifications. Paragraph 5 of the counterclaim stated: "That the plaintiff,
Clark Equipment Company, is liable to the counterclaimant, Transport Equipment Center, Inc., .in a sum
of·money exceeding $35,000.00 on account of the ·said
breach of representation, warranty and failure to comply with specifications." Defendants asked for judgment against Credit, but there was no averment that
Credit was liable to T.E.C. in any amount by virtue of
the matters complained of in the first cause of action.
The second cause of action, by T.E.C. against both
Credit and Clark, claimed a breach of a "dealer investment plan" agreement dated Decen1ber 28, 1960.
T.E.C. sought damages "exceeding $100,000," arid
asked that the court award judgment "in an amount
determined by the court to represent the damage sustained by the counterclaimant under the second cause
of action of the counterclaim for breach of contract."
In a .reply ( R. 24-37) the plaintiffs denied the
essential averments of the first cause of action and, with
4
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respect to the second cause of action, alleged failure to
perform conditions precedent, repudiation, and estoppel.
In an amended answer (R. 66-68) defendants
raised an additional defense to enforcement of the
note- "duress and economic con1pulsion." The defense
is set out in its entirety in appellants' brief, pages 5-8.
The duress relied upon- briefly stated, consisted of
misrepresentation as to what the agreement contained;
sl~w delivery of trailers; improperly built trailers; refusal to negotiate ; threat to "take over" the business ;
refusal to permit T.E.C. to handle other makes of
trailers; and. delay in negotiation of settlement of claims.
These things adversely affected the economic condition.
of T.E.C. and "caused" it to enter into the revolving
credit agreement.
A supplemental complaint (R. 77-79) alleged
additional defaults by T.E.C. under the note (failure to
pay principal and interest and ceasing to be a dealer
for Clark) since the filing of the complaint and asked
for interest accrued and to accrue prior to judgment.
Established Facts
The statement by appellants gives the impression
that the action had hardly begun when the respondents,
on the basis of the pleadings, sought and obtained a
su1umary judgment. The fact is, the action was begun
on January 27, 1961, and thereafter for approximately
10 months the parties were engaged in extensive discovery work. Respondents took the depositions of the
5
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principal defendants, and obtained answers to interrogatories and admissions relating to the conduct of
the parties and to the documents. The case was· more
than a year old when the trial court granted a summary
judgment in favor of Clark Equipment Credit Corpora·
tion against all of the defendants on the revolving credit
note and the guaranties.
During the ten months of discovery it became apparent that most of the material facts governing the
revolving credit note were not in dispute, and that those
in dispute were not, because of controlling legal principles, material to disposition of the case. The following
facts were established by the pleadings themselves:
T.E.C. entered into the revolving credit agreem~nt with
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation on or about
November 23, 1959, at which time, and pursuant to the
agreement, Credit lent to T.E.C. $100,000.00 and
T.E.C. executed and delivered its 7 per cent note to
Credit in the amount of $100,000.00. At the same time
the individual defendants executed and delivered their
unconditional guaranties of payment, Nick Galanis and
Nora Galanis guarantying 50 per cent of the amounts
due or to become due on the note, the other individual
defendants guarantying 100 per cent.
In their brief the appellants do not claim that they
were not in default under the terms of the revolving
credit note and that the amounts provided for in the
note were payable unless the defense of duress and economic compulsion was valid; they have abandoned the

6
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defenses based upon waiver and estoppel, since they
have not argued them in the brief; and the supplemental
complaint shows that no effort was made after the bringing of the action to keep payments on the note current
or to make valid tenders, though conditional. It is not
disputed that T.E.C. ceased to act as a dealer for Clark.
Other established facts relating specifically to the
claimed duress and economic compulsion will be set out
in the argument.

ARGUMENT
I

The facts admitted by the defendants-appellants
in their pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and
responses to requests for admissions show that there was.
no legal duress or business compulsion which would
affect the validity of the revolving credit note.
In the appellants obsessive desire to theorize about
corporate identity and interlocking directorates they
have neglected to cite any cases to support their claim
that the actions of Clark and Credit constitute "duress
and business compulsion." And for the purpose of eliminating arguments about irrelevant matters, we will concede, for the purpose of this brief, that if the revolving
credit note was given to Clark Equipment Credit Company because of the duress and (actionable) business
compulsion of Clark Equipment Company, the defense

7
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would be available as well against one as the other. This·
follows without regard to corporate identity. Restate1nent of Contracts_, § 477 (a), 496.
(The appellants' concern with corporate identity
may be partly the fault of respondent. In support of the
motion for summary judgment respondent relied, in
part, upon an affidavit of John R. Wood describing the
ways in which Clark and Credit are maintained and
operated as separate corporations. This, however, was
for the purpose of demonstrating to the trial court that
there was no valid reason for refusing to enter a judgment for Credit merely b~cause a counterclaim was
pending against Clark. The trial court apparently
agreed, and appellants' have not assigned this aspect
of the case as error.)
The essential point is that, under facts testified _to
or conceded to be true by appellants, the conduct of
Clark and Credit does not constitute duress or business
compulsion. ·
The revolving credit agreement shows on its face
and appellants acknowledge that it was executed in the
State of Michigan (R. 100, Para. 6.4; John Galanis
deposition, P. 55) . Accordingly, the law of Michigan
governs a determination of whether the note is voidable
for duress. See llestatement of Conflict of Laws_, §
84~:

"The law of the place of contracting deter:.
mines whether a promise Is void, or voidable,
8
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for fraud, duress, illegality or mistake or other
legal or equitable defense."
Moreover, the "law of the place of contracting" has
been articulate, for the question of what constitutes
duress has been considered in a number of Michigan
cases, none of which can offer solace to appellants.
In 1881 in Hackley et al. v. Headley~ 45 Mich. 569,
8 N.W. 511 the Supreme Court of Michigan began a
line of cases in which it has refused to set aside transactions on the claim that one of the parties that he was
"compelled" by force of circumstances to enter into the
agreement. Headley had sued Hackley and McGordon
to recover compensation for cutting, hauling and delivering logs, plaintiff relying upon a claim of duress to avoid
the effect of a settlement agreement. The duress consisted of the following: Headley claimed defendants
owed him approximately $6,200.00. He went to the
defendants' place of business and had an interview with
Hackley who insisted that the estimate should be made
according to a different scale and that the amount due
was $4,260, more or less. Hackley stated that he would
give Headley $4,000 or the partners' note for $4,000.
Headley said he couldn't take it, that it wasn't right,
and that Hackley knew it. Hackley replied "that is the
best I will do for you." Headley said "I cannot take that
}Ir. Hackley," and Hackley replied "you do the next
thing you are a mind to. You can sue me if you please."
Headley said he did not sue him because he had to have
the money that day, couldn't wait for it, and would

9
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probably be ruined financially because he had no othet
arrangement to get the money. Finally, he took the note
and gave the receipt, because at the time he could do
nothing better, and in a belief that he would be financially ruined unless he had immediately the money that
was- offered to him, or paper by means of which the
money might be obtained. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed a verdict in favor of the pl~~t~ff, saying:
"Of what did the· alleged duress consist in'
the present case. Merely of this: that the debtors
refused to pay on demand a debt already due,
though the plaintiff was in great need of the
money and might be financially ruined in case
he failed to obtain it. It is not pretended that
Hackley and McGordon had done anything to
bring Headley to the condition. which made this
money so important to him at this very 'time, or
that they were in any manner responsible for
his pecuniary embarrassment except that they
failed to pay this demand. The duress, then, is to
be found exclusively in their failure to meet
promptly their pecuniary obligation. But this,
according to the plaintiff's claim, would have
constituted no duress whatever if he had not
happened to be in pecuniary straits;. and the
validity of negotiations, according to this claim,
1nust be detern1ined, not by the defendants' conduct, but by the plaintiff's necessities. The same
contract which would be valid if made with a man
easy in his circumstances becomes invalid when
the contracting party is pressed with the neces-:sity of immediately meeting his bank paper. This
would be a most dangerous, as well as a most
unequal doctrine; and if accepted, no one could
well know when he would be safe when dealing
10
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on the ordinary terms of negotiation with a party
who professed to be in great need."
In Goebel v. Linn., 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284, the
Supreme Court of Michigan relied on Hackley v. Headley and reiterated the view that duress "in the refusal
to keep the previous engagement" falls far short of
legal duress.
In Gill et al. v. S. H. B. Corporation., 822 Mich.
700, 84 N.W. 2d 526, contractors had brought an action
against an owner to recover the balance claimed to be
due under a contract for the construction of dwelling
houses on a cost plus fixed fee basis. One of the defenses
was a settlement agreement, but plaintiffs sought to
avoid the effect of the settlement agreement on the
ground that they had signed the release in order to
obtain from defendant money needed to pay subcontractors and materialmen, which defendant refused to
pay; that at the time they executed the release they
had faced financial ruin in the event that defendant did
not pay them the sums then due; and that they had
served notice on the defendant that they elected to
declare the release void. The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the trial court's ruling that the duress
defense could not stand:
"The duress or business compulsion which
plaintiffs alleged caused them to execute the
amended contract and release consisted of threats
by the defendant to abandon the building project
and failure by it to pay plaintiffs the sums then
due them at a time when plaintiffs were desper11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ately in need of funds and faced financial rl!in
in the event of their failure to collect. Relied
on by plaintiffs is Vyne v. Gl~n~, 41 Mi~h. 112,
1 N.W. 997, in which the plamhff therem, who
was then involved in financial embarrassment,
was induced by the defendant therein to give a
receipt in full by threats to stop payments of
money to plaintiff from other parties. The court
held that the receipt was obtained under duress
and was therefore void. To accept the plaintifl's
contention that the Vyne case is controlling here
would be~ in effect~ to hold voidable every contract~ renegotiation or compromise settlement
resulting from one party~s refusal to pay the full
amount then claimed by the other party to be due~
particularly if the party were~ at the time~ financially embarrassed. Such it not the law.n (Em~
phasis added.)
In Finn v. Miller~ 330 Mich. 396, 47 N.W. 2d 660,
the court in rejecting a claim of duress arising out o~ a
construction contract, said:
"***The next three points boil down to this,
that defendant failed to pay as originally and
later agreed and failed to give plaintiff advance
notice of his intention not to pay. There is no
showing that plaintiff's financial distress was
caused by any unlawful act on defendant's part.
The four factual points raised by plaintiff do
not suffice either individually or in combination,
to establish the exertion by defendant upon
plaintiff of such. dures.s as would entitle plaintiff
to a decree setting aside the compromise settlement of a disputed claim and a release from further liability."
See also M1Mial et uaJ. v. Yatzik et uaJ.~ 329 Mich.
12
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379, 45 N.,V. 2d 329, and Norton v. Michigan State
Highway Department~ 315 Mich. 313, 24 N.W. 2d 132,
in which claims of duress, based upon similar grounds
to those stated in the instant case, were rejected by the
Supreme Court of Michigan.
To paraphrase thelanguage of the Michigan court
in Goebel v. Linn~ 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284, supra,
the conduct relied upon by appellants falls far short of
conduct constituting duress. The cnnduct relied upon
by appellants is set out in their answers (R. 137-141,
165-169) to interrogatories (R. 82-86):
In November, 1959, Clark Equipment Credit Corporation "insisted on payment" of interest on trailers,
"delivery of which had been cancelled by the defendant."
Moreover, Clark Equipment Credit Company "arbitrarily deducted" the amount from the proceeds of the
note and "refused any adjustment or compromise on the
disputed claim." If Transport Equipment Center had
not agreed to this the alternative would have been immediate payment, which would have bankrupted T .E.C.
(R. 165). T.E.C. was further told that the Clark
account had to be paid, and if the indebtedness could not
be paid, Credit would provide money for payment by
means of the revolving credit note and agreement on
terms insisted upon by the plaintiffs. These conversations occurred over a period of approximately 9 months,
and during that period numerous conversations were
held between the above named officials of the plaintiffs
and John Galanis. After execution of the revolving
13
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credit note and agreement, no attempts were ever made
by T.E.C. or the individuals to repudiate or rescind the
agreement. During that time no suggestion was made
respecting the revolving credit agreement and revolving
credit note by plaintiffs and no threats with respect to
such suggestions were 1nade by the plaintiffs. The defendants did not repudiate or attempt to rescind the agreement because they were "not in an economic or financial
position to even suggest .a rescision or repudiation (R.
137-141).

The duress also consisted in Mr. .John Wood, Mr.
Frank DeShon and Mr. Gordon Thorpe telling Transport Equipment Center, Inc., that "if the money could
not be raised to pay the indebtedness of the defendant
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., to the plaintiffs,
that he had no alternative but to sign" the agreements
(R. 138).
During the course of negotiations leading to the
revolving credit note and agreement, the defendant
T.E.C. and its officers believed uthat this arrangement
might present a solution to the problemn and for that
reason, they discontinued and failed to pursue other
sources of credit which would have been available to
place the defendant Transport Equipment Center, Inc.,
in a financial position to continue business without the
execution of a revolving credit agreement and revolving
credit note (R. 140).
The reference to refusing to permit the defendant
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., to handle other

14
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makes of trailers, has nothing to do with the revolving
credit note and agreement. According to the answer to
interrogatory No. 10 (R. 140), the conversation concerning handling of· other trailers was not had until
March 2, 1960, more than three months after the note
was signed. In any event, according to the answer to
-~nterrogatory No. 11, the statement was made in passing
and no attempt was made by John Galanis to inquire
further of the plaintiff corporation as to whether the
statements of Gordon Thorpe represented the views
of the corporation. It is clear from the deposition of
John Galanis that Transport Equipment Center, Inc.,
was indebted not only to Clark Equipment Company,
but to other lenders and sellers at the time of the execution of the revolving credit agreement. The company
wanted some money and was willing to sign a note to
get it. This was a far cry from duress. The following
occurs in the deposition of John Galanis (Pages 26-32):
"Q. Now at the time of the revolving credit
agreement, did you have then some claimed adjustments with Clark?

A. That is correct.
Q. When you were discussing the contract
did you talk about those adjustments at all?

A. Yes sir.
Q. Who did you discuss them with?

A. Oh we discussed them-initially I discussed
them with Mr. John Wood, who was then the
acting general manager of the Brown Trailer
Division; I discussed them with Mr. DeJohn

15
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[should be DeShon], and we discussed them with
Mr. Perrigo, who was then the branch manager
of the Denver branch for Clark.

* * *
Q. What was the purpose of these discussions?

A. Trying to arrive at a basic procedure for
allowance of these trailers, processing of credits
due use when the trailers were taken in, processing of discrepancies between what we would initiate as a stated condition of the trailer, and then
when the trailers were received maybe the tires
were supposed to be 80 per cent good and they
would arrive 20 per cent good, and such things
like that.
Q. And at the time of this revolving credit
agreement, were you trying to arrive at some sort
of balance between you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did you arrive at a balance then?
A. Well after the discrepancy was broken
down and rehashed and hashed and all the agreements and disagreements were gone over, they
arrived at a balance of a net owing to them of
around $62,000.
Q. Did you agree to that?
A. Well- at that point they said, "this is what
the balance is~ and if yon want to $100,000 loan~
to get everybody on a clean slate.. this is what we
will agree to~ and I says~ '"allright ..· this is what
we will agree to ...
Q. And you understood that that was what you
were agreeing to at that time?

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. That is correct.
Q. And you did get the loan?

A. Yes sir we got the loan.
Q. How was that loan disposed of? What was
that money used for?

A. Well, in the revolving credit agreement,
we, at the time of putting the loan into effect,
were not to owe any large sums of money to any
other loaning institutions that were .signature
notes at this time. Prior to the writing of the note
agreen1ent, we had, in order to maintain a normal
course of business, borrowed one note of $14,000
and one note of $9,000 from the Walker Bank,
which bore no collateral- they were signature
loans. We owed to a supplier in Los Angeles,
which was our second largest supplier other than
Clark, approximately $13,000, I _believe, on
equipment that we had purchased from them that
we had proposed to finance through Clark Credit.
So, when the final accounting was arrived at,
we owed Clark Equipment approximately
$63,000, we owed Walker Bank approximately
23 which would be 86, and 12 that we owed the
Transi-Cold Corporation in Los Angeles which
was about 98, so after paying off all our encumbrances we ended up with about a net $2,500, I
believe, out of the $100,000.

*

* *

Q. But you did pay off those other substantial
obligations?

A. Yes.
Q. So that at that time your only creditor
would have been the Clark Equipment Company?
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A. That is correct.
Q. So you would start off clean as of the date
of the revolving credit agreement?
A. That is correct.

*

* *

Q. Over how long a period of time was this
revolving credit agreement negotiated?

A. You mean how long were the negotiations?
Q. Yes you were trying and talking the thing
out?

A. I believe we started negotiations on this
in approximately August, and the negotiations
were going on, audits and what not, up to and
including the month of November when the thing
was actually initiated.
MR. ALLEN: This was 1959?
Q. Did Wood Worsley [T.E.C.'s then attorney] participate with you throughout these negotiations?

A. Some of them yes, where we thought it was
necessary for him to be present.
Q. And he looked over the agreements for you,
did he?

A. Yes sir.

*

* *

A. Well, immediately following the credit
agreement and the consummation of the same,
we decided at that. time that if the two operations
were kept on a strictly cash flow type of basis, we
would never put ourselves in a position ,vhere we
would be in this, you n1ight say, dire need again.
In other words, we said that the two accounts
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were now clean as a whistle on both ends. Therefore, at the tenth of the following month, on any
transaction that we might have with them, they
would like to receive a check from us paying their
bill, and by the same token, any charges or encumbrances that we may have against them, they
also at the tenth of every month would remit to
us their check and we- Mr. DeShon and myself
were very confident at that time that if this type
of relationship were maintained that there would
never be any reason for any discrepancies on the
accounts or anything like that again."
The description of the confidence, the relationships,
the borrowings, the payments of other debts, and the
anticipation of closer'working together between Transport Equipment' Center, Inc., and Clark Equipment
Company are entirely iuconsistent with the duress now
claimed by appellants. The only "wrongful" conduct
of which appellants complain is the failure of Clark to
perform its contractual obligation, and a misrepresentation of the terms and meaning of a note and agreement
that had been examined prior to execution of appellants'
lawyer.
The undisputed facts preclude appellants from
establishing duress under Michigan law. Moreover,
should the court decide Michigan law does not control,
nevertheless there is no "wrongful" action of the type
referred to in Fox v. Piercey~ 119 Utah 367, 227 P. 2d
763. The law of Michigan corresponds with the law
generally relating to duress, none of which helps the
appellants. See Fr·uhauf Southwest Garment Co. v.
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United States~ I l l F. Supp. 945; Inland Empire Refining Co. v. Jones~ 69 Idaho 335, 206 P. 2d 519; Oleet v.
Pennsylvania Exchange Bank~ 137 N.Y.S. 2d 779.

II

The appellant.;;~ by failing to rep1tdiate the agreeand tender the consideration received~ are bound
by the terms of the note and agreements.

ments~

The defense of duress and business compulsion was
an afterthought in the first place - or second place. If
there was any duress, it was certainly removed by J anuary 27, 1961, when the action was brought by Clark
Equipment Company and Clark Equipment Credit
Corporation against Transport Equipment Center, Inc.,
and the individual defendants. There was then no longer
any reason to acceed to any demands of the two companies, or not to repudiate the revolving credit agreement if it had been entered into by duress. The defendants didn't repudiate the agreement. Moreover, they
sought to enforce a subsequent agreement based upon
a subsequent adjustment of accounts (including the
revolving credit note) between Clark Equipment Company, Clark Equipment Credit Corporation, and Transport Equipment Center, Inc., the dealer investment plan
contract of December 28, 1960.
On August 17, 1961 (or enough in advance of-that
to permit drafting of a pleading) it finally occurred
to the defendants that they had entered into the revolv-
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ing- credit note and agreement and guaranties because
of the "duress and economic compulsion" exerted upon
them by the plaintiffs prior to and on November 23,
1959. The defense was pleaded almost seven months
after the respondents had done about everything they
could do to the respondents·. They had initiated the
action, had attempted to obtain appointment of a
receiver for the property of T.E.C. and had terminated
the dealer agreement. Notwithstanding this, Transport
Equipment Center, Inc., had not until the filing of the
amended answer,taken any steps to repudiate its solemn
agreement, and has never yet tendered the consideration
received from Credit.
Rules set out in the Restatement of Contracts are
representative of court decisions as to the power to avoid
a contract entered into because of duress:
"§499. (I) Except as stated in sub-section (2),
the power of avoidance and the remedies of an
injured party where the transaction is voidab~e
for duress *** are the same, and are subject to
the same conditions as where a transaction is
voidable for fraud under the rules stated in sections 482-484.
" ( 2) '¥here a transaction is voidable on
account of duress or undue influence *** the
power of avoidance is not lost while the circumstances that rendered the transaction voidable
continue to exist.
"§ 482. Where an offer to return performance received by a party injured by fraud or misrepresentation is necessary to avoid a transaction
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and such an offer is made and rejected, in order
for the avoidance to remain effective, he must
hold for the other party what he has receiv:d
and refrain from exercising acts of ownership
over it.***
"§483. ( 1) The power of avoidance * * * is
lost if after acquiring knowledge thereof the injured party unreasonably delays manifesting to
the other party his intention to avoid the transaction.***
"§484. The power of avoidance *** is lost if
the injured party after acquiring knowledge of
the fraud or misrepresentation manifests to the
other party to the transaction an intention to
affirm it, or exercises dominion over things restoration of which is a condition to his power of avoidance, except as stated in section 482."

In this case it is admitted by the deposition of the
President of Transport Equipment Center, Inc., that
at the time of executing the revolving credit note T.E.C.
received from Clark Equipment Credit Corporation
approximately $38,000 in excess of credits given to
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., in payment of the
"agreed indebtedness" of T.E.C. to Clark. There was
never any effort on the part of Transport Equipment
Center to return the consideration received by it at the
time of signing the revolving credit note. Under the
cases, there wasn't any duress. If there was, T.E.C.
asserted it too late.
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III

On the basis of facts obtained from the defendants
themselves the trial court was duty-bound to enter a
summary judgment for the plaintiff.
J

The facts presented to the trial court as a basis for
the motion for summary judgment (except for the
affidavit of John R. Wood) were facts obtained from
the defendants themselves, in pleadings, depositions,
requests for admissions, and interrogatories. The appellants have not indicated that they have evidence of a
different quality than that presented to the trial court,
but they argue that a summary judgment is a "drastic"
remedy which should not be hnposed when "fact issues"
are raised by the pleadings.
The cases don't support the appellants' anguished
cry. Under applicable law, the defense of duress is not
and cannot be made out on the basis of the facts relied
upon by appellants.
A litigant cannot avoid the effectiveness of the
summary rule by being a profuse or articulate pleader.
Regardless of what he says in his pleadings, if facts
obtained from him in the discovery process discredit
the pleadings, the opposing party may be entitled to a
summary judgment. As this court said in Continental
Bani£ and Trust Cornpan;IJ v. Cunningham} et al.J 10
Utah 2d 329, 353 P.2d 168,
"That the counterclailn's allegations were inconsistent with the facts developed under the
discovery process did not impel a finding that

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there was a fact issue that must have been presented to an arbiter of the facts. Under Rule
56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having
to do with summary judgment, the facts pleaded
in the counterclaim created a situation something
akin to a presumption that dis3:ppears o;n ~ro
duction of indisputable or adrmtted antitheiCal
facts. The rule permits an excursion beyond the
pleading. If facts discovered in the journey
. irrefutably disprove facts pleaded, summary
judgment is appropriate on motion therefor.
The rule has been interpreted more articulately
by eminent authorities on the subject who suggest that the rule permits us to pierce the pleading, resulting in a summary judgment, if an
examination of facts developed under the discovery procedure, by affidavit, deposition, admission or the like, makes it appear that no
genuine issue of the fact is presentable. To
travel beyond that point would be a waste of
time, energy and cost. The rule designedly
seeks to eliminate protraction, absent issues of
fact, expediting litigation in an area where possible congested calendars point up the truism
that justice delayed is justice denied."
That the trial court can grant a summary judgment
on the basis of admissions or state1nents of the party
against whom summary judgment is granted is made
clear in the case of Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn_, et al._,
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P .2d 266.
We have no argument with the rule stated by the
appellants, followed by the court in the. May case, that
in order to justify a summary judgment the pleadings,
evidence, ad1nissions and inferences therefro1n, viewed
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1nost favorably to the loser, must show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; that such
showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given a trial.

Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center .. Inc ...
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, cited by appellants in support of their claim that a summary judgment was improper, used language similar to that in the May Company case, and was itself a case in which the action of
the trial court in awarding sununary judgment was
upheld by the court. The court had looked past the
pleadings and held the appellant to his statements in
depositions and other discovery.
As pointed out by this court in Ulibarri v. Christenson.. et al ... 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170, in those
instances in which the trial court is convinced that no
reasonable finder of fact could find that the burden of
establishing the case (or defense) "then it was his duty
to rule as a matter of law" that the claim of defense did
not exist.
The same point of view is expressed in Abdulkadir
v. Western Pacifiic Railroad Company .. 7 Utah 2d 53,
318 p .2d 339:
"We are in accord with the idea that the right
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safeguarded. This, of course, does not go so far as
to require the submission to a jury of issues of
fact merely because they are disputed. If they
would not establish a basis upon which plaintiff
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could recover no matter how they were resolved,
it would be ~seless to consume time, effort and
expense in trying them, the savi!lg of which is
the very purpose of summary Judgment procedure. The pertinent inquiry is whether under
any view of the facts the plaintiff could recover.
It is acknowledged that in the face of a motion
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to have the trial court, and this
court on review, consider all of the evidence
which plaintiff was able to present, and every
inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to him."
But viewing things "in the light most favorable to"
appellants does not require the trial court to ignore
plain mandates of court rulings concerning the kinds
of conduct necessary to constitute duress or business
compulsion. In this case it is clear that the actions
relied upon by the appellants to establish duress and
business compulsion are actions which do not, in law,
constitute duress or business compulsion. The most
respondent (or its parent corporation, Clark Equipment Company) could be said to have done was to fail
to live up to its bargains. The cases discussed under
Point II of the argument show that this kind of conduct
is not duress.
Moreover, taking the testiinony of the appellants
the1nselves, and the record in this court action, it is clear
that the defendants took no steps to bring themselves
within the rule requiring a repudiation of the transaction or returning to the other party the consideration
received. It is undisputed that the appellant corporation
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received $38,000 over and above the a1nounts paid to
Clark Equip1nent Co1npany by Clark Equipment Credit
Corporation on Clark's claims against T.E.C. As far
as we know, it still has the $38,000 and intends t to
keep it.
In sum1nary, this court has considered the su.rnrllai~Y
judgment rule many times and it would serve no purpose
to discuss all of the cases in which the court has approved
the rendition of a summary judgment or reversed the
denial of a sunurtary judgment. The court did one or
the other, however, in each of the following cases:
Morris v. Farnsworth Motet 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d
297; Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company~ 3 Utah
283, 292 P~2d 1004; Holland v. Columbia Iron Mi1ting
Company~ 4 Utah 2d 303~ 293 P.2d 700; Reese v. Mur.:.
ray Board of Edu£ation~ 6 Utah 2d 196, 310 P.2d 387;
and Aetna Loan Company v. Fidelity & Deposit Co1npany~ 9 Utah 2d 412, 346 P.2d 1078.
CONCLUSION
. The claim of. appellants that they were denied
their day in court is overwhelmed by a record that
shows the defendants. to have been given every opportunity, from the time of filing the complaint until
argument of the motion for summary judg1nent many
Inonths later, to produce some material evidence or
respectable contention relating to duress and. business
cmnpulsion. The only things they came up with were
activities which do not, under the law of Michigan ( 01~
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any other state), constitute duress or business compulsion. The claim is that respondent and its parent
promised to.do things but didn't do them, e.g., that the
corporations promised to build trailers according to
specifications but didn't; that they promised to deliver
according to particular schedules but didn't; and that
they promised to make adjustments for breaches of their
own contracts but didn't. These breaches of contract
are said to have put the appellants into a position in
which it was necessary for them to sign the revolving
credit note and agreement. But these activities don't
constitute duress or business compulsion. 'Vhen John
Galanis went back to Buchanan, Michigan, to obtain
the loan, the only "duress" exercised against him then
and there was that the company told him if Transport
Equipment Center, Inc., wanted the money, it would
have to agree to the adjustments proposed, sign the
note, and obtain the guaranties.
The evidence is conclusive that neither the respondent nor its parent corporation exerted the kind
of force upon the appellants that comes within any
legal definition of duress. If breaches of contract
occurred, they were collateral to, not part of the note
transaction. Under the circumstances, it would have
been a waste of time to set up for trial an issue relating
to duress and business compulsion. A jury would have
had to be directed to bring in a verdict as to the affirmtive defense of duress and business compulsion. The
fact that there are cases like Holzman v. Barrett~ (7th
Cir) 192 F.2d 113, cited by the appellants, in which
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there are triable issues of fact relating to duress and
coercion does not help the appellants in this case for
here there isn't any such triable issue. The paper
defense interposed by the appellants in this case proved
to be a paper dragon and got what was coming to it.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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